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Financial Corporations and Subchapter S:
An Interesting Problem
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1958 with the
stated purpose of permitting businesses to select the form of organization
desired without having to take into consideration major differences in tax
consequences. 2 Unfortunately, small financial corporations have been effec-
tively denied the benefits3 of the subchapter S option by a series of adverse
court determinations and Internal Revenue Service regulations. The essence
of these determinations and regulations is that financial corporations cannot
meet the requirements of the income test contained in subsection 1372(e)(5)
of the Internal Revenue Code because their income is derived primarily from
interest received on loans. This income, it is reasoned, is a form of proscribed
revenue which terminates the subchapter S election if it comprises more than
twenty percent of the gross receipts of the corporation. The subject of this
note is to determine whether the congressional intent in regard to this income
test has been correctly interpreted, and therefore, whether financial corpora-
tions should be precluded from electing subchapter S because of the nature of
their income, assuming that all other requirements for the election are met. 4
THE PROBLEM: THE AMBIGUITY OF SUBSECTION 1372(e)(5)
Legislative History and Administrative Interpretation
Subchapter S became law with the enactment of the Technical Amend-
ments Act of 1958. 5 As previously mentioned, 6 the purpose of the subchapter
was to permit the selection of the form of doing business, e.g. corporation,
'I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
2S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, repfnted in 1958 C.B. 922, 1008.
3Thcre are three major reasons why a corporation can benefit from electing subchapter S.
First, and probably most important, is the elimination of the corporate tax liability, thereby
avoiding the double taxation of corporate earnings. The firm's earnings are deemed to be
distributed pro rata to the stockholders, who pay only their individual tax on this income. I.R.C.
§ 1373(a). Second, subchapter S allows the shareholders to report the corporation's net operating
loss on their personal returns. I.R.C. § 1374(b). This deduction is allowed for the year of its oc-
currence with a three year carryback and a seven year carryforward. I.R.C. § 172(b). Without
the election, these corporate net operating losses would be deductible only by the corporation. A
shareholder would reap a tax benefit only if the losses were so great that they bankrupted the
firm, in which case the shareholder could report a capital loss in a worthless security. I.R.C. §
165(g). Third, the corporation's capital gains retain their character when they are passed through
to the shareholders as real or constructive dividends. I.R.C. § 1375(a)(1). Further, I.R.C. § 1231
(basically, non-inventory property of a trade or business) gains are passed through as capital
gains and therefore do not offset the shareholder's own § 1231 losses. B. BITTKER AND J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 6-22 (3d ed. 1971).
'For the other miscellaneous tests which must be satisfied see I.R.C. §§ 1371 and 1372.
5Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958).
6See note 2 supra & text accompanying.
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partnership or individual proprietorship, to be made without consideration of
the major differences in tax treatment which would otherwise inhere in these
different forms. Unfortunately, the draftsmanship was hurried, and because
no hearings were held, the origins of many provisions are obscure.
7
Subsection 1372(e)(5) imposes a restrictive income test on those cor-
porations which opt to elect subchapter S. This subsection, originally entitled
"Personal holding company income," provides that a corporation's subchapter
S election terminates if the corporation "has gross receipts more than 20 per-
cent of which is derived from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities,
and sales or exchanges of stock or securities .... The 1958 committee
reports give no explanation for the personal holding company income limita-
tion. 9 In fact, an earlier Senate Finance Committee report does not even
mention an income test as being one of the criteria for a valid subchapter S
election. 10
In 1966, for reasons which are not entirely clear, Congress amended
subsection 1372(e)(5)." t The subsection was retitled, substituting "Passive in-
vestment income" for "Personal holding company income." The committee
reports issued contemporaneous with and subsequent to the 1966 amendment
provide insight only into the general congressional intent involved in enacting
the whole of subchapter S. A report issued by the Senate Finance Committee
in 1966, for example, noted that the congressional intent when enacting sub-
chapter S was to include only small businesses actively engaged in a trade or
business. 12 This view was reiterated in 1970 when the Senate Finance Com-
mittee stated that Congress intended subchapter S to be applicable solely to
operating firms.' 3
In light of this general intent, the most probable reason' 4 for the restric-
tive income test of subsection 1372(e)(5) is to reduce the possibility of utilizing
subchapter S to minimize the costs of incorporating passive investment ac-
tivities while obtaining the tax benefits normally accorded only to corporate
'Hewitt, Some Intriguing Recent Developments in Subchapter S, 44 TAXES 848, 848 (1966).
'I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5).
'See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1958 C.B. 922.
1"See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4623.
"I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5), as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-389, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 114 (1966). No
reason was given in the committee reports for the name change. See S. REP. No. 1007, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1154 reprinted in [19661 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2141.
"See S. REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1154, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD
NEWS 2141, 2148.
"Although a committee report written with regard to a subsequent enactment is not
legislative history with regard to a previously enacted statute, it is entitled to some consideration
as a secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion." Bobsee Corp. v. United States. 411
F.2d 231, 237 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1969).
'"S. REP. NO. 91-1535, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6098, 6099.
"4One commentator has speculated that the Treasury has become so accustomed "to lambasting
personal holding companies and Congress is so used to depriving them of tax protection,~ that
the "conventional wisdom" requires that they be prohibited from electing subchapter S even if
the result is nonsensical. See Borsook, Few Personal Holding Companies Will Qualify for Sub-
chapter S Election, 10 J. TAX. 19, 19 (1959).
[Vol. 52:851
SUBCHAPTER S
business forms.' 5 This "incorporated pocketbook" objection is not new; both
the IRS and the Treasury have made their position on such attempts clear for
some time.'
6
Given the lack of any specifically enunciated congressional intent in con-
nection with the income test of subsection 1372(e)(5) and the potential for
abuse of subchapter S through such devices as the "incorporated pocket-
book," it is not surprising that the IRS promulgated regulations importing a
restrictive interpretation to the subsection. It is this interpretation of the in-
come test which assists the courts in denying small financial corporations the
benefits of a subchapter S election. The IRS' very literal interpretation pro-
vides basically that all interest, regardless of how it is earned, is passive in-
vestment income under subsection 1372(d)(5). Obviously, a small financial
corporation which has interest income as its primary, if not exclusive, source
of revenue can never meet the income test of subsection 1372(e)(5), and
therefore can never elect subchapter S given the current administrative inter-
pretation. Furthermore, attempts to challenge these regulations have met
with limited success in the courts.
Judicial Interpretation
Following the Treasury regulations, and struggling with the inherent am-
biguities in the statute, the courts construing subsection 1372(e)(5) have
generally denied the subchapter S election to financial corporations. The Tax
Court has been especially adamant in preserving this interpretation. A brief
review of a sampling of subsection 1372(e)(5) cases best illustrates the trouble
which the courts have had in deciding this issue.
In two recently decided cases' 7 which arose prior to the 1966 amendment
of subsection 1372(e)(5), the Tax Court decided factually identical situations
differently. This legal legerdemain was made possible by application of the
Golsen'8 rule which states that the Tax Court will follow the holdings of the
taxpayer's circuit court of appeals. While the taxpayers involved in the two
cases were shareholders in the same small finance company which had elected
subchapter S, they resided in different federal judicial circuits.
In the first case, the taxpayer, Puckett, was subject to the jurisdiction of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit, prior to the Tax Court's deter-
mination in the instant case, had held in House v. Commissioner that the pre-
1966 subsection heading "Personal holding company income" meant that only
personal holding company income was proscribed. Since the Code's personal
,11d. For further analysis see text accompanying notes 81-83 infra.
'"Hewitt, Some Intriguing Recent Developments in Subchapter S, 44 TAXES 848, 859 (1966).
"Kenneth W. Doehring [1974] 43 T.C.M. (P.H) 74,234 (subchapter S election disallowed),
rev'd 37 A.F.T.R.2d. 76-396 (8th Cir. 1975), and Paul E. Puckett, [1974] 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,
235 (subchapter S election allowed), affd 522 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, both taxpayers
were ultimately allowed to make the subchapter S election.
"Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 940
(1971).
19453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972).
1977]
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holding company provisions provide that financial corporations which derive
more than sixty percent of their ordinary gross income from the active con-
duct of a business are not considered personal holding companies, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the interest revenue of a financial corporation would
not serve to terminate a subchapter S election. 20 The Tax Court, therefore,
following the Golsen rule, did not terminate the election as to Puckett, the
Fifth Circuit resident, because for him the interest earned by his small loan
company was not considered to be proscribed.
In the second case, however, the taxpayer, Doehring, was a resident of
the Eighth Circuit. The Tax Court was free in this case to decide the issue on
its own since the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had never ruled on the
question. The Tax Court determined that the interest income terminated the
corporation's subchapter S election, thus denying subchapter S treatment for
Doehring. Although the Eighth Circuit subsequently reversed the Tax Court,
the case remains significant for two reasons: First, it indicates the position of
the Tax Court and second, the Eight Circuit's opinion was expressly limited
to cases arising prior to the 1966 amendment.
Although the number of future cases involving subchapter S elections
made when the heading was "Personal holding company income" will be in-
significant, 21 the importance of the general issue survives. Small financial cor-
porations should be allowed to elect subchapter S treatment. Moreover, it is
possible that without reasoned legislative or judicial guidance, the Doehring-
Puckett anomaly could occur again. Assume, for example, the identical fact
situation except in a post-1966 setting. It is quite likely that the Fifth Circuit
would allow a financial corporation to elect subchapter S, citing the strong
dicta of House v. Commissioner that interest earned from an active business is
not proscribed "passive investment income." 22 It is equally likely that the
Eighth Circuit would disallow the election because of the specific language in
Doehring v. Commissioner limiting the election for financial corporations to
pre-1966 years. 23
The sole case dealing with the post-1966 subsection, Marshall v. Commis-
sioner,24 was decided without an in-depth analysis either of the reason for the
1966 amendment or of the terms "gross receipts" and "interest" used in the
statute. The Marshall court argued that when Congress changed the title of
subsection 1372(e)(5) from "Personal holding company income" to "Passive
investment income" it effected a substantive change in the law.25 The court
reasoned that since finance companies are specifically exempt from the per-
°Id. at 987.
"Note, however, that while the tax years involved in the Puckett and Doehring cases were 1962
and 1963, the Tax Court did not decide these cases until 1974 and the circuit courts decisions
were rendered in 1975.
"House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972).
23Doehring v. Commissioner, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-396, 76-399 (8th Cir. 1975).
24510 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975). The circuit court held that the interest earned by the loan
department of a corporation was passive income within the meaning of subchapter S and thereby
precluded a subchapter S election.
"Id. at 263.
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sonal holding company rules, if the pre-1966 "Personal holding company" ti-
tle used by subsection 1372(e)(5) was meant to refer to the other personal
holding company provisions, 26 it should have followed that finance companies
be allowed subchapter S treatment. The court then asserted that the 1966
revision of the subsection heading could "only be seen as Congress' calculated
effort to erase utterly any implication that a small corporation must be a per-
sonal holding company before it can be excluded from Subchapter S
treatment" by section 1372.27 At another point the court stated that this
name change would have been "completely pointless" had Congress not
originally attached some value to the title "Personal holding company in-
come."2 8
While the Marshall court's holding that a substantive change occurred in
1966 is plausible, it does not seem to be the most reasonable interpretation of
the name change. There are three reasons which support the contention that
the title change was not meant to affect the statute substantively. First, while
it is logical to conclude that an amendment to an unambiguous statute in-
dicates an intent to change the law, no such inference arises when the
legislature amends an ambiguous provision.2 9 Clearly, the differences between
the two sections both entitled "Personal holding company" were significantO°
and made the meaning of subchapter S ambiguous. The change in name may
have been made to prevent such confusion.3'
Second, Congress gave no reason for the change32 Considering there were
no court cases interpreting subsection 1372(e)(5)'s title "Personal holding
company income," Congress could not have intended to change any judicial
construction of the act. 33 It seems difficult to believe that a major change was
intended in the absence of any enunciated congressional desire and when
there could be no case law to overrule.
'I.R.C. § 542(c)(6).
27Marshall v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 259, 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
21 1d. This conclusion was quoted, with approval, in Doehring v. Commissioner, 37 A.F.T.R.2d
76-396, 76-399 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1975) (dictum).
ZTaylor v. Crisp, 286 N.C. 488, 497, 212 S.E.2d 381, 387 (1975) quoting Childers v. Parker's,
Inc. 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 484 (1968).
The fact of amendment does not indicate whether the change is of substance or form. IA
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.30 (4th ed. 1972).
30First, the qualifying tests are different. To elect subchapter S, less than twenty percent of a
firm's gross receipts must be from specific income, while to be considered a personal holding com-
pany more than sixty percent of a firm's adjusted ordinary gross income must be from certain
types of income. I.R.C. §§ 1372(e)(5), 542(a)(1). Second, certain specifically named income for
one subchapter's purposes is not proscribed income for the other subchapter. Gains from the sale
of stock or securities are tainted for subchapter S, but do not affect the personal holding com-
pany provisions. I.R.C. §§ 1372(e)(5), 543(a), (b)(1). Third, the quantum of similar income is
treated differently. Rents and royalties are always passive subchapter S income; however, if they
exceed fifty percent of the firm's ordinary gross income they are not considered personal holding
company income. I.R.C. §§ 1372(e)(5), 543(a)(2), (3), (4).
"
1Note, An Approach to Legislative Revision of Subchapter S, 26 TAx L. REv. 799, 817 (1971).
"tSee S. REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1154, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2141.
"
5The first decision on this subject was in Valley Loan Ass'n v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 673
(D. Colo. 1966), rendered five months after the subsection title was changed.
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Third, apparently even the Treasury did not feel there was a change
because no new regulations were promulgated to explain the meaning of the
new subsection heading.3 4 This would be unusual behavior if the Treasury
thought a significant modification of the statute had occurred.
Marshall's assertion that the 1966 name change affected substantive rights
does not appear persuasive when contrasted with the three factors which
weigh against that proposition. However, even if a change was intended by
this renaming of the subsection, Marshall's conclusion that loan companies
cannot elect subchapter S does not appear warranted. The title was changed
to "Passive investment income" which, at least on its face, should apply to
passive, non-operating businesses, rather than to active loan companies.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Financial corporations should not be precluded from electing subchapter
S for two reasons. First, loan repayments should be included in the meaning
of "gross receipts." This would have the effect of increasing the base figure so
that these firms would pass35 the twenty percent passive income test. While
the present Treasury regulations exclude these loan repayments from gross
receipts, the regulations should not be upheld because they are unreasonable
and inconsistent with the statute. Second, even if loan repayments are not
considered gross receipts, an election should be possible because "interest,"
when used in the passive investment income limitation section,3 6 was not ineant
to include interest earned on loans by an active lending institution.
Gross Receipts
"Gross receipts" is defined neither in the statute nor in the committee
reports. The regulations define it as the total amount received or accrued
under the method of accounting used by the corporation in computing its
taxable income.3 7 It expressly excludes amounts received as repayment of an
outstanding loan.3 8
Treasury regulations must be sustained unless they are unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.3 9 They constitute contem-
poraneous constructions by those charged with the administration of such
statutes and should not be overruled in the absence of compelling reasons. 40
Nevertheless, this regulation should be overruled.
34See Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4 (1958).
"
5 Care should be taken so that "pass" is not misunderstood. The statutory test provides that if
more than twenty percent of a firm's gross receipts is derived from passive investment income a
subchapter S election cannot be made. "Pass" is meant to indicate that a firm qualifies for elec-
tion under this test, i.e., that its passive income is less than twenty percent of its gross receipts.
36I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv)(a) (1958).
38 d.
"United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973).
"Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
[Vol. 52:851
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First, this regulation unreasonably discriminates in favor of corporations
which sell from inventories. By using a gross receipts test instead of a gross in-
come 4' test, Congress gave added assurance that a business which sold from
inventory would not suffer a revocation in the event that it temporarily sold
its goods below cost. There would still be gross receipts to increase the base
for passing the twenty percent test, even if the corporation had no gross in-
come.
In substance, there seems to be little difference between the recoupment
of the cost of goods sold in gross receipts for firms selling inventory, and the
repayment of principal for firms "selling" the time value of money. However,
the regulation's specific exclusion of loan repayments from gross receipts will
preclude finance companies from electing subchapter S for the following
reason. With loan repayments excluded, the primary source of receipts for
financial corporations is interest. Since total gross receipts will be substantial-
ly composed of proscribed income, finance companies will continually fail the
twenty percent test.
Congress did not show any intent to discriminate in favor of firms with
inventories. Its only stated purpose was to allow small businesses to elect sub-
chapter S. 42 Therefore, in the absence of a congressional desire to
discriminate in favor of firms with inventories, and where there is no substan,
tive economic difference between companies, 43 the regulation should not be
upheld. Admittedly, the test for overruling regulations, that the regulations
must be "unreasonable and inconsistent with the statute," is conclusory.
However, a regulation which treats economically similar enterprises different-
ly, when Congress did not intend such disparate treatment, should plainly
meet this test.
Second, Congress carved its exceptions from the definition of gross
receipts when it restricted the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of
securities to gains only rather than permitting inclusion of the gross sales
price, and when it excluded amounts received under section 33144 if the elec-
ting corporation owned more than fifty percent of the liquidating corpora-
tion.4 5 The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius4 s implies that had
Congress wanted to exclude loan repayments from gross receipts, it would
have so specified in the statute.
Third, the regulation is internally inconsistent. "Gross receipts" is defined
as the total amount received or accrued under the method of accounting used
by the corporation in computing its taxable income.4 7 It should be noted that
"Gross income from sales is gross receipts less cost of goods sold.
'
t See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1958 C.B. 922. 1008.
"
5See notes 69 and 70 infra & text accompanying.
"I.R.C. § 331 states that amounts distributed in complete or partial liquidation of a corpora-
tion shall be treated as payments in exchange for the stock. This means that such exchanges will
be accorded capital gain or loss treatment.
0I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C).
"6To mention specific exceptions to a general rule is to preclude all others. While this principle
is an aid to statutory construction, it is not a rule of law. It can never override clear and contrary
evidence of congressional intent. Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
'
7Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv) (1958).
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receipts representing the adjusted basis of property are nontaxable income. 48
They are a return of capital, which has always been excluded from gross in-
come. The tax-free return of capital rule provides an exclusion from income,
not a deduction; such receipts are therefore never accrued in computing a
corporation's taxable income.
49
Since the regulation considers these tax-free revenues representing a
return of capital as gross receipts for sales of property,5 0 the nontaxable return
of capital funds from the repayment of the loan principal5' should also
logically be includable as gross receipts in "sales" of the time value of
money.5 2 Thus, the regulation provision which excludes repayment of loans
from gross receipts conflicts with its example which includes funds represen-
ting a return of capital in that definition. 53 Internal inconsistency in a
Treasury regulation significantly impairs its value as an aid to the interpreta-
tion of a statute,5 4 and therefore, such a regulation should not be followed.
The case of Marshall v. Commissioner55 has sustained this regulation,
holding that it is not inconsistent with the subchapter S statute. The circuit
court felt that when Congress changed the name of subsection 1372(e)(5)
from "Personal holding company income" to "Passive investment income" in
"This has been undisputed since Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
"1Yet, in contravention of the regulations. tax-free revenues which would therefore not be ac-
crued as gross income can still result in gross receipts for that tax year. In Branch v. United
States, 67-2 U.S.T.C. 9636 (N.D. Ga. 1967) the court held that option payments actually
received in the tax year were gross receipts even though they were not taxable income until the
year in which the option either expired or was excercised. Of course, while these option payments
are considered gross receipts in a year when they are tax-free, they certainly do not represent a
return of capital.
Similarily, the court in Buhler Mortgage Co. 51 T.C. 971, 976 (1969), affd per curiam 443
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1971), stated in dictum that tax-free revenues, the proceeds of notes sold to a
third party at a loss, would unquestionably be included in gross receipts. The court held.
however, that these notes were "securities" and therefore because the statute specifically limited
the gross receipts from the "sale or exchange" of securities to gains, no gross receipts resulted
from this sale at a loss.
It should be noted that a broad reading of Buhler, that notes are always "securities" and
therefore the gross receipts from loan payments should be limited to gains, i.e., interest, is
precluded by case law. The payment and discharge of a note is neither a "sale" nor an "ex-
change." Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436, 437 (1939); Riddell v. Scales, 406 F.2d 210,
212 (9th Cir. 1969).
"
0Example (1) in Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5) (1958) illustrates that gross receipts are not reduced
by the adjusted basis of property when the property is sold.
"
1Rosenberg v. United States, 21 A.F.T.R.2d 788, 789 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
"
2Alfred M. Sieh, 56 T.C. 1386, 1392 (1971) affd without opinion 73-1 U.S.T.C. 9281 (8th
Cir. 1973), stated in dictum that payments on principal are considered part of gross receipts for
a firm whose principal trade or business is financing.
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5) (1958), example (1).
"United States-v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 n. 12 (1957). The defendant, who transferred
wager records from the initial collectors of the wagers to the party against whom the players bet.
was convicted of failure to pay a special occupational tax on "receiving wagers." The Treasury
regulation which accompanied this statute considered record transferors such as the defendant
liable for the tax in one of its examples. However, in an earlier example, the regulation exemp-
ted secretaries and bookkeepers from the act, drawing a distinction between receiving "wagers"
and receiving "receipts of wagers for accounting purposes." The Court ignored the regulation
noting that it was internally inconsistent because its distinction between receiving wagers and
receiving receipts of wagers could not be valid regarding record transferors and other recorders.
55510 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975).
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1966, it indicated that the subsection should apply to business operations
other than personal holding companies.5 6 Thus, financial corporations,
although exempt from the personal holding company provisions,5 7 would not
be allowed to elect subchapter S because of the requirements of section 1372.
A more likely explanation for this name change, since it was accom-
panied by no judicial construction of the term "personal holding company in-
come," no indication by Congress that a substantive right was being affected,
and no new regulations promulgated by the Treasury to cover this different
name, would be that no substantial change was intended.5 8 The name change
was probably made to avoid confusion, since there were significant differences
between the personal holding company income defined in subsection
1372(e)(5) and the personal holding company provisions of sections 542 and
543.59
However, even if Marshall's conclusion that the subsection applies to
business firms other than personal holding companies is correct, it does not
follow that financial corporations cannot elect subchapter S. Congress chose
to title the election-terminating revenues "passive investment income," which
appears to be in contradistinction to active business income. Under this inter-
pretation, a loan company, an active business, would not be precluded from
electing subchapter S; only firms with passively earned investment income
which exceeded twenty percent of their gross receipts would have their elections
disqualified.
Further, Marshall approved the regulation because it precludes a cor-
poration from manipulating its gross receipts by artificial transactions which
have no effect on its real income.60 Absent this regulation, the court
hypothesized that a corporation, realizing that its passive investment income
would exceed twenty percent of its gross receipts, would simply make a short-
term loan, which does not decrease its gross receipts, and then take repayment
in time to inflate its gross receipts for the tax year. 6' By its own words, Mar-
shall supports the regulation only because it prohibits sham transactions.
However, the remedy is too drastic for the putative harm because as written,
the regulation prevents even bona fide loan repayments from increasing gross
receipts. A far better solution to allay the fears of the Marshall court would
be to scrutinize the substance of the transaction.62 This would allow gross
receipts to be increased if the transaction were a bona fide loan repayment,
but not if it were a sham.6 3
"
6Id. at 263.
III.R.C. § 542(c)(6).
"For an analysis of the meaning of this name change, see text accompanying notes 29-34
SUpTG.
SSee notes 30 and 31 supra & text accompanying.
6 Marshall v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 259, 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
611d
,
62It is beyond peradventure in tax law that substance should control over form. See Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
"While the details of different sham transactions are probably infinitely diverse, one example il-
lustrates the possibilities. Company A, with large cash balances, on December 29 has passive in-
vestment income exceeding twenty percent of its gross receipts and later that day makes a large.
19771
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Interest
"Gross receipts" as presently defined by the regulations would not prevent
a subchapter S election by small loan companies if interest earned on loans
was not proscribed by subsection 1372(e). At first glance it would appear ob-
vious that interest earned on loans is the type of interest mentioned in this
subsection entitled "Passive investment income." However, words in the Code
sometimes have very unusual meanings. 64
"Interest" is not defined in subchapter S. The regulations define it as any
amount received for the use of money, 65 but the regulations are inconsistent
in this area. In defining "rents," another of the election-terminating passive
revenues, the Commissioner specifically excludes payments for the use of
rooms or space where significant services are also rendered . 6
There can be no logical reason that rents from an active business, with
certain modifications, will not be considered proscribed "rent," while interest
from an active business67 will always be disqualifying "interest." As noted
before, courts ignore internally inconsistent regulations,6 8 and little credence
should be given to this regulation.
Since the regulation's definition should not be followed, a closer look
must be taken at the statute itself. By the wording of its title, "Passive invest-
ment income," the subsection indicates that Congress perceived something
particularly "passive" in the receipt of interest, as well as the five other types
of proscribed income, 69 which does not exist with regard to other revenues.
This simply does not comport with reality. There is nothing more passive
about the receipt of interest (and principal) when a firm is "selling" the time
value of money than the receipt of sales revenue when a company is selling
inventory. Both businesses must "buy" their "inventory." A manufacturing
plant does this in the form of payments for labor and material while the
financial corporation "buys" the use of funds by paying interest on various
types of savings accounts and certificates of deposit. The selling price of in-
interest-free loan to a "sister" corporation, requiring repayment by the following day. This loan
arrangement should certainly not be considered bona fide.
"See, e.g., I.R.C. § 751(d)(2)(B) where inventory is defined to include accounts receivable.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vii) (1958).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi) (1958).. The regulation modifies the. common sense meaning
of rent; these significant services must be other than those usually rendered in connection with
the rental of rooms. The Commissioner, in promulgating Rev. Rul. 65-91, 1965-1 C.B. 431. has
further complicated this area. That ruling lists four fact situations and states whether each situa-
tion fits the definition of rent. It gives no support for its conclusions, which are not obvious and
are truly of a generalization-defying nature.
"Active and passive businesses can best be understood as different points on a continuum. A
loan company would be considered an active business if it had numerous employees, paid rent
for office space, screened loan applicants for risks, negotiated interest rates and had a bevy of
collection attorneys ready if the debtor defaulted. In contrast, a corportion whose only business
consisted of one shareholder-employee who, quarterly, took a passbook to the bank so the interest
could be recorded would be considered a passive business.
"United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 359 n. 12 (1957). See note 54 supra.
69Rents, royalties, dividends, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities. I.R.C. §
1372(e)(5).
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ventory by the manufacturing firm is theoretically composed of the cost of
goods sold and a gross profit. Similarly, the lending institution requires
repayment of principal, basically its "cost of goods sold," plus interest,
primarily the gross profit. 70
The question is reduced to one of identifying which receipts Congress in-
tended to vitiate the election. There is little doubt that if Congress meant to
define passive investment income to include both interest of a passive nature
and interest derived from the active conduct of a business it could so
legislate. 71 In determining what Congress intended 7 2 there is nothing
sacrosanct about the wording of the definition included in the act. Definitions
are themselves written in words whose meanings, whether viewed separately or
in conjunction with the terms being defined, may be determinable only
through interpretation. 73 The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that words
used in definition sections also need further defining 74 and that the object in-
tended to be reached by the act must limit and control the literal import of
the terms and phrases employed. 75 Congressional word choice is no talisman
to be slavishly followed if the intent of that body would indicate a contrary
result. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
[T]he colloquial words of a statute have not the fixed and artificial content of
scientific symbols. They have a penumbra, a dim fringe, a connotation, for
they express an attitude of will, into which it is [the court's] duty to penetrate
"More precisely, the gross profit of a financial corporation is the difference between the cost of
its money and the interest earned on this particular loan. For example, if company A has savings
accounts and certificates of deposit as well as outstanding common stock, preferred stock and
short-term and long-term bonds, it will have a certain cost of capital. The difference between
that cost of capital and the interest rate on this loan should be the firm's gross profit. The profit
is not the entire interest rate earned on the loan, it is just the difference between the rate charg-
ed and the cost of capital. For further discussion of the components of a firm's cost of capital,
see A. BONESS, CAPITAL BUDGETING 44-66 (1972) and B. MOORE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY OF FINANCE 84-88 (1968).
"However, at least one court has spoken out against this type of "loose" definition. In United
Interchange v. Spellacy, 144 Conn. 647, 655, 136 A.2d 801, 805 (1957), the court wrote that it
was questionable whether a legislature could, by defining as a dog an animal having the com-
ponents of a horse, subject the owner of a horse to the dog licensing statute.
"This does not mean what was in the minds of congressmen. The chance that several hundred
members of Congress each had the litigated issue in mind as a possible reduction from the statute
is infinitesimally small. The chance is still smaller that the litigated issue was not only in the
minds of all these members but that they had also reached a conclusion about it. Radin,
Statutory Construction, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
"12A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.07 (4th ed. 1972).74See, e.g., Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945).
"Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892). In the ensuing eight
decades the Court has consistently held that congressional intent will prevail over the literal
meaning of the words of the statute. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); United
States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971).
There may be limits to the extent that congressional intent can override the words of the
statute. For example, if Congress used the word "white" in a statute, the courts could hardly con-
strue the word as meaning "black". even if a congressional report gave it that meaning. R. PAUL,
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 434 (1954).
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and which [judges] must enforce ungrudgingly when [they] can ascertain it,
regardless of imprecision in its expression.7 6
The Supreme Court has stated that there is no sound reason to look only
at the text, even when a statute's meaning seems obvious and that there is no
rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how
clear the words may appear on superficial examination.7 7 In this case, care
should be taken in construing the word "interest" in all cases as a type of
passive investment income.
There are two primary methods of ascertaining legislative intent. First,
consideration should be given to the committee reports which were written by
the congressmen who drafted the act. 7 8 As was noted previously, the commit-
tee reports for section 1372 indicate that operating businesses should be
allowed to elect subchapter S.9 Therefore, since the intent of Congress
should control over the literal meaning of the statute's words, subchapter S's
passive investment income limitations should apply solely to passive
nonoperating firms and not to active loan companies, which should be allow-
ed to make the election.
A second guide to the meaning of a statute can be found in its purpose.8 0
The harm to be stopped by the exclusion of passive income in subsection
1372(e)(5) was the possibility of incorporating personal investment activities,
electing subchapter S, and obtaining the tax deferral benefits accorded to pen-
sion and profit-sharing plans without any additional tax cost. 8 ' The tax advan-
tage here is that payments to these plans are generally deductible by the
76Commissioner v. Ickelheimer. 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.. dissenting). In-
terestingly, Hand contrasted the vague meaning of words to the "fixed" meaning of scientific
symbols. Several courts have held figures in a statute to represent different numbers than they
appear to represent. See, e.g., Wesley v. Bd. of Educ., 403 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. 1966); Kiley v. Ken-
nedy, 16 Misc.2d 969 (Sup.Ct.), 190 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1958).
"Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943).
78Legislative intent should be found by looking at the objective manifestations of that body.
This parallels the method courts use to ascertain the meaning of contract terms. 4 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 600A (3d ed. 1961).
Such objective manifestations of congressional intent can be found in the committee reports.
For generations the sheer bulk of legislative business has been deemed to make it
necessary for each house of Congress to delegate to committees the major part of its
day-to-day work in determining what laws are needed and what form they should take.
Every bill . . . immediately after introduction, is therefore referred to a committee,
and the house normally takes no action on the measure unless and until the committee
reports favorably thereon. The primary function of the committee report is . . . to ap-
praise that body of the substance of the committee's recommendations and its reasons
therefor. To the extent that the house passes the provisions as recommended by the
committee, it is considered to have adopted as its own the views stated in the report.
G. FoLsoi. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 28 (1972). The Supreme Court has repeatedly used committee
reports as evidence of congressional intent. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 287-88 (1956).
"See text accompanying notes 11 and 12 supra. Compare Swank & Son, Inc. v. United States.
362 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D. Mont. 1973) affd 522 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that the com-
mittee reports evince a congressional purpose to distinguish between active and passive corpora-
tions) with Zychinski v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 999
(1975) (stating that these committee reports do not support the proposition that active secutities
dealers can elect subchapter S).
8 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463 (1892).
8 Hewitt, Some Intriguing Recent Developments in Subchapter S, 44 TAXES 848, 859 (1966).
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employer8 2 in the current year and are not includable in the gross income of
the employee until the year received. 83 The employee will usually be in a
lower tax bracket after he has retired and these payments will accordingly be
taxed at a lower rate. The advantage of subchapter S, in contrast to merely
setting up these same plans in a regular corporate form, is the total elimina-
tion of the corporate tax. By imposing the passive income restraint, Congress
attempted to preclude persons from receiving this additional tax deferral ad-
vantage without incurring any tax cost.
This is no reason to uphold a passive income limit today. The Tax
Reform Act of 196984 imposed H.R. 10-type (self-employed retirement
plans) 85 limitations on pensions paid to a shareholder-employee of a sub-
chapter S corporation.8" Now only fifteen percent of a shareholder-
employee's87 compensation, up to a maximum of $7500, can be contributed
to a retirement plan and not be included in the employee's gross income for
the current year. 88 Since these limits are the same as those imposed on the
self-employed, 89 there can be no pension and profit-sharing tax advantage by
incorporating personal investment activities.
The conclusion seems clear. Courts can restrict the literal meaning of a
statute's words if that result would be in harmony with congressional intent.
The legislative desire that income from operating firms should not be pro-
scribed is found both in the committee reports and in the fact that this pro-
scription will not remedy the evil of abuse of the corporate form, which has
been dealt with in another section of the Code.
In Marshall,9" the court held that a subchapter S election was terminated
for a small loan company because more than twenty percent of its gross
receipts was derived from interest. After upholding the Treasury regula-
tions,"5 the court argued that all interest above the. requisite percentage is
fatal because the clear language of subsection 1372(e)(5) enumerates interest
as a form of passive investment income per se.
92
"
1 See I.R.C. § 404(a).
83See I.R.C. § 451(a).
"
4 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
'
5 I.R.C. § 404(e).8 1.R.C. § 1379.
87Any employee or officer of a subchapter S corporation who owns or is considered as owning
within the meaning of § 318(a)(1), the family attribution rule, more than five percent of the
outstanding stock of the corporation is a "shareholder-employee." I.R.C. § 1379(d).
88I.R.C. § 1379(b)(1).
"See I.R.C. § 404(e).
'OMarshall v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975).
91The court concluded its analysis by noting that the Service's definition of "passive investment
income" may well exclude some types of business operations from subchapter S treatment, but
that there was nothing in the statute or its legislative history which would suggest that every cor-
poration should, as a matter of right, be able to make the election under § 1372(a). Indeed, the
court was of the opinion that the various requirements under §§ 1371 and 1372 indicate that not
every corporation is entitled to the benefits of subchapter S. Id. at 263.
This conclusion begs the question. No one argues that every corporation can elect sub-
chapter S, and it is the determination of these very "rights" and "requirements" which will
disclose whether loan companies can make the election.
921d. at 264.
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The court assumed its conclusion. The assertion in a judicial opinion that
a statute needs no interpretation because it is clear is in reality evidence that
the court has already considered and construed the act. 93 Further, the conclu-
sion does not appear to be warranted in light of the evidence indicating a
congressional desire to allow active businesses to elect subchapter S. 94
Arguing that the words of a statute should not be read alone, but in con-
junction with the legislative purpose, the court in House v. Commissioner9"
held that interest earned by a small loan company should not preclude a sub-
chapter S election. Specifically, the court noted that subsection 1372(e)(5)
headings "Personal holding company income" and "Passive investment in-
come" were deliberately employed by Congress to make clear its legislative
purpose and therefore the word "interest" should not be read in isolation.16
Without more analysis, the court then concluded that interest earned by
small lending institutions fits neither the words "personal holding company
income" nor the words "passive investment income," and thus such firms can
elect this subchapter.9 7 Therefore, construing the words "passive investment
income" in harmony with the legislative intent leads to the conclusion
originally espoused in House and later followed in Puckett, that finance com-
panies should be allowed to elect subchapter S.
CONCLUSION
Treasury regulation 1.1372-4(b)(5) which excludes loan repayments from
gross receipts should not be upheld because it discriminates in favor of firms
with inventory, carves out an unwarranted exception from the meaning of
"Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 869 (1930). The commentators seem
uniform in agreeing with this analysis. Extrinsic facts may show a contextual meaning which the
words will fairly bear and which better accords with the statutory purpose. They may bring to
light an ambiguity in language which was assumed to be clear and explicit. In such a case, ex-
trinsic aids show that the meaning was never clear. If, as is often said, the phrase "plain and ex-
plicit meaning" indicates that it is the only meaning the words will bear, then it begs the ques-
tion. All possibilities of the existence of other reasonable meanings are therefore cut off. de
Sloov&e, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA. L. Rev. 527, 553 (1940).
"Statements that the statute is clear and unambiguous in no way disclose the source from
which or manner in which meaning is derived. Such statements are merely complicated explana-
tions of the court's satisfaction with the result it reaches reading the statute as it reads it."
Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, 338 (1949).
The coup de grace may well have been given by Sutherland. Statements arguing that a
statute is clear can hardly be taken at face value after opposing parties have gone to all the ex-
pense and trouble to litigate a question about the meaning of a statute and have carried the issue
through several courts. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (4th ed. 1972).
94See text accompanying notes 79-89 supra.
95453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972).
981d. Accord, Paul E. Puckett [1974] 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,235, affd 522 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1975).
It should be noted that headings are part of the context of the statute and should be con-
sidered when interpreting the latter. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 65 (1900); Carter v.
Liquid Carbonic Pacific Corp., 97 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1938).97With just as little analysis, Kenneth W. Doehring, [1974] 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 74,234, rev'd 37
A.F.T.R.2d 76-396 (8th Cir. 1975), held that lending institutions did not qualify for subchapter
S. The reversal by the Eighth Circuit was only for the pre-1966 years.
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gross receipts, and is internally inconsistent. If subsection 1372(e)(5) is pro-
perly construed, financial firms should be able to treat loan repayments as
other firms treat sales revenue, thereby passing the twenty percent test for
passive income and qualifying for a subchapter S election. In addition, even
if financial companies do not pass the percentage test, an election should be
allowed because the word "interest" in the statute should be read in harmony
with the words of the subsection's heading "Passive investment income" and
thus comport with the congressional desire to allow active lending institutions
to benefit from the advantages of subchapter S. For these reasons, financial
corporations should be allowed to elect subchapter S.
JEFFREY K. RIFFER

